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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
There are four critical legal questions that this appeal presents: 1) When does the two-year
statute of limitations under Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) begin to accrue; 2) Whether the question of
damages is the primary question for a jury to determine; 3) Whether the knowledge of an attorney
who is an employee and agent of a tortfeasor can be imputed to a client to overcome the
fraudulent concealment provisions of Idaho Code§ 5-219(4); and 4) Whether Idaho Code§ 5219(4) is constitutionally void for vagueness as applied to Ms. Walsh's claims. The holding of the
District Court is not consistent with the legal precedent established by this court and is axiomatic
to a fair and just resolution of the claims where a claimant has asserted a legal malpractice claim
against an attorney.
The Plaintiff and Appellant, Sharon Walsh ("Ms. Walsh") brings this appeal from a
summary judgment in a legal malpractice action brought against the Defendants, Swapp Law,
PLLC, dba Craig Swapp & Associates, ("CSA") and Stephen Redd ("Mr. Redd" and jointly with
CSA, the "Defendants"). Mr. Redd was an employee of CSA.
The essential facts underlying the claim relate to two motor vehicle collisions in which
Ms. Walsh was injured and was represented by the Defendants. Both collisions occurred in 2013
separated by three months. In both collisions, Ms. Walsh complained of an injury to her neck and
she was treated by her primary care provider as well as a chiropractor Dr. Jon Gray. After the
second collision Ms. Walsh underwent surgical correction for a damaged disc in her cervical
spine. In total special damages exceeded $140,000.00 of which only $5,000 were incurred prior to

the second collision. As a result of the injuries sustained Ms. Walsh was left with a permanent
disability.
On February 5, 2015, based on Mr. Redd's recommendation, Ms. Walsh executed a
release agreeing to settle the claim for the first collision for $8,000 and a medical release of
approximately $5,000. In support for his opinion, Mr. Redd told Ms. Walsh that the settlement
was the top offer and that she would not improve her position by litigating the claim. Ms. Walsh
accepted the representations of Mr. Redd and agreed to settle the claim for the first collision on
February 5, 2015.
However, prior to recommending that Ms. Walsh settle the claim for the first collision,
CSA had received a letter from attorneys representing Ms. Walsh's health insurance provider,
Blue Cross of Idaho, asserting a right of subrogation for medical expenses they attributed to the
first collision in the amount of $60,572.08. CSA never informed Ms. Walsh or Mr. Beckett of the
Blue Cross and Blue Shield's demand until disclosing the letter in discovery in the present case.
On March 2, 201 7, Ms. Walsh filed an action against CSA and Redd asserting among
other claims, legal malpractice. In July 2018, the Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment asserting the Ms. Walsh's legal malpractice claims were barred based on the statute of
limitations because Ms. Walsh's lawsuit was filed more than two years after the alleged
malpractice occurred.
Ms. Walsh presented evidence and argued to the court that there were no objectively
ascertainable damages for her claim of malpractice until the second lawsuit was settled.
Specifically, Ms. Walsh articulated that on February 5, 2015 there was no ascertainable damages
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to initiate an action for malpractice against the Defendants and therefore the statute of limitations
could not have begun to accrue on that date. Ms. Walsh further argued and presented evidence
that even assuming that there was objectively ascertainable evidence of damages in relation to her
malpractice claims, CSA and Mr. Redd fraudulently concealed this evidence until after her
lawsuit for malpractice was filed against the Defendants. In spite of Ms. Walsh's arguments and
evidence, on October 3, 2018, the Honorable Judge Samuel A. Hoagland granted the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment. Thereafter, Ms. Walsh timely requested the District Court
reconsider its order of summary judgement. However, the Honorable Judge Samuel A. Hoagland
denied Ms. Walsh's Motion for Reconsideration on February 4, 2019. Ms. Walsh now appeals
from the October 3, 2018 order and the February 4, 2019 order.

B. Course of Proceedings
On or about March 2, 2017, Ms. Walsh filed a lawsuit the Defendants for among other
claims, legal malpractice. R. pp. 8-43. During the discovery process, Ms. Walsh became aware for
the first time that the Defendants had concealed a demand by Blue Cross and Blue Shield for
subrogation for medical expenses that far exceeded the amount of her settlement which was
negotiated by the Defendants. R. p. 527, fn. 1. In July 2018, the Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment. R. pp. 68-86. Ms. Walsh filed a response to the Defendants' motion as well
as a motion to amend the Complaint. R. pp. 164-204; 315-325. The Court granted the Defendants
motion for summary judgment on October 3, 2018 and entered judgment in favor of the
Defendants. R. pp. 526-545. Ms. Walsh timely filed a motion for reconsideration on October 17,
2018. R. pp. 560-576. On the same day, the Defendants filed a motion for costs. R. pp. 546-559.
On November 27, 2018, the Defendants responded to Ms. Walsh's motion for reconsideration. R.
3

pp. 577-598. On February 5, 2019, the Court denied Ms. Walsh's motion for reconsideration and
granted the Defendants' motion for costs and entered judgment in favor of the Defendants. R. pp.
608-624. On March 19, 2019, Ms. Walsh filed the Notice of Appeal in this matter. R. pp. 625638. Ms. Walsh now appeals all orders and both judgments entered against her in this matter. R.
p. 633.

C. Statement of Facts
On February 8, 2013, Ms. Walsh was rear-ended by Jake Hanson. R. p. 526. On May 7,
2013, Walsh's vehicle was struck by Donald LaMott. R. p. 526. Following the second collision,
Ms. Walsh contacted CSA and retained the law firm to represent her with regard to her personal
injuries in both collisions. R. p. 526.
On June 3, 2013, CSA opened a case filed for Walsh and she executed a Contingency Fee
Retainer Agreement. R. p. 527. On June 5, 2013, Paul Swainston, an attorney at CSA, sent Ms.
Walsh a letter stating that he would personally direct the activities of her case manager,
negotiator, and paralegal. R. p. 527. Swainston identified Cindy Rhoades as her case manager,
Stephen Redd as her negotiator, and Diana Philips as her paralegal. R. p. 527. In September 2014,
Craig Swapp allegedly took over from Swainston as the supervising attorney on Walsh's file, with
Mr. Redd continuing to work on Ms. Walsh's cases. R. p. 527. Ms. Walsh believed and
understood that Redd was her attorney. R. p. 527.
On April 30, 2014, Redd submitted a Statement of Claim on Wash's behalf to Hanson's
insurer, American National Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("ANPAC"), offering to
settle her claim pertaining to the February 8, 2013 collision for $16,500.00. R. p. 527. In January
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2015, ANPAC extended an offer to settle the case for payment to Walsh in the amount of
$8,000.00, plus ANPAC's agreement to satisfy an outstanding medical payment lien in the
amount of $5,000.00. R. p. 527. On February 2, 2015, Chasan & Walton, LLC, ("CW") attorneys
for Blue Cross of Idaho, ("Blue Cross") sent a letter to CSA asserting that Blue Cross had paid
medical bills totaling $60,572.08 for the 2/8/13 accident. R. p. 343. On February 2 or 4, 2015,
Redd discussed the offer with Walsh and she authorized the settlement, based on Redd's
recommendation that she settle. Redd conveyed acceptance of the offer to ANP AC the same day.
R. p. 527. On February 5, 2015, Walsh executed a release agreement related to the February 8,
2013 claim in exchange for $8,000 and payment of the medical lien. R. p. 527. On February 10,
2015, CW sent another letter to CSA confirming that they had been advised by Mr. Redd that
CSA was in the process of settling Ms. Walsh's claims arising from the February 8, 2013 accident
and requesting CSA keep $61,304.21 in trust for Blue Cross' subrogation claim. R. p. 342. Ms.
Walsh attested that CSA never informed her about either letter from Blue Cross, nor about the
subrogation claim that Blue Cross was asserting. R. p. 332.
On April 29, 2015, CSA, on behalf of Walsh, filed a lawsuit against Donald LaMott in the
Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho for negligence related to the May 7, 2013 car
collision under Case No. CV PI 1507302. R. p. 528; also Judicial Notice of filed case. In June
2015, Walsh's case was assigned to Kristian Beckett, a new associate at CSA. R. p. 528. In June
2015, Beckett informed Mr. Swapp that he believed CSA may have committed malpractice by
settling the February 2013 claim, however at the time any damage caused by the firm were not
ascertainable. R. p. 528. On September 23, 2015, Mr. LaMott filed an answer to Ms. Walsh's
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complaint under Fourth District Court Case No. CV PI 1507302, denying all liability alleged
under Ms. Walsh's complaint. Judicial Notice of filed Answer.
On or about March 25, 2016, Ms. Walsh was deposed by Mr. Stefanie at his office. During
the deposition it was clear that Mr. Stefanie was going to contend that Ms. Walsh's injuries were
caused by something other than the May 7, 2013 collision. R. p. 336, ,r 57. Following the March
25, 2016, deposition, Mr. Beckett informed Ms. Walsh for the first time that in his opinion - CSA,
and more specifically Mr. Redd, may have committed malpractice when Mr. Redd recommended
that Ms. Walsh settle claim on the February 8, 2013 collision without first obtaining a global
settlement. R. pp. 335-336, ,r,r 52, 58, 60. Prior to Mr. Beckett's communication with Ms. Walsh
on March 25, 2016, Ms. Walsh had no knowledge that CSA may have committed malpractice. R.
p. 336, ,r 59. Mr. Beckett handled Ms. Walsh's case as an associate attorney for CSA until he
terminated his employment with CSA in April 2016. R. p. 529. After leaving CSA, Mr. Beckett
continued to represent Ms. Walsh in the LaMott lawsuit.
On March 2, 201 7, Ms. Walsh filed the instant legal malpractice action against the
Defendants. R. p. 529. On June 20, 2017, Ms. Walsh filed an Amended Complaint alleging (1)
legal malpractice (negligence), (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) breach of contract, and (4)
negligent hiring, training, and supervision. R. p. 529. While many of the allegations of negligence
involve the Hansen case, Ms. Walsh made numerous allegations of negligent actions committed
by the Defendants subsequent to February 5, 2015, including but not limited to: failing to property
investigate the May 2013 claim, failing to inform Walsh of her subrogation responsibility to Blue
Cross of Idaho for the February 8, 2013 claim, and failing to pay the subrogation interest on
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medical treatment allocated to the February 8, 2013 claim. R. pp. 36-37. Ms. Walsh did not
become aware that the Defendants had concealed a demand by Blue Cross and Blue Shield for
subrogation for medical expenses until after the malpractice action was filed. R. p. 527, fn. 1.
Ms. Walsh ultimately settled her claims against Mr. LaMott and released all of her claims
against Mr. LaMott in exchange for the full value of insurance he maintained on the date of the
collision, or $100,000.00. R. p. 529. Ms. Ms. Walsh also accepted an additional $100,000.00
under an underinsured motorist policy she maintained. R. p. 529. These settlements were finalized
and the Walsh v. Lamott case was dismissed after this action was filed, on October 12, 2017. R. p.
529.
In July 2018, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. R. pp. 68-86. Ms.
Walsh filed a response to the Defendants' motion as well as a motion to amend the Complaint. R.
pp. 164-204; 315-325. As part of Ms. Walsh's response to the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, Ms. Walsh provided a sworn affidavit attesting that Mr. Redd never informed her about
either letter from Blue Cross, that Blue Cross was making a subrogation claim, or that she could
be responsible for repaying Blue Cross ofldaho pursuant to her policy of insurance. R. p. 332.
Ms. Walsh further provided deposition testimony from Mr. Swapp and Mr. Redd confirming that
they never informed Ms. Walsh about the Blue Cross demand letters. R. pp. 362-364; 410-411.
On October 3, 2018, the Court granted the Defendants motion for summary judgment on
and entered judgment in favor of the Defendants. R. pp. 526-545. Ms. Walsh timely filed a
motion for reconsideration on October 17, 2018. R. pp. 560-576. On the same day, the Defendants
filed a motion for costs. R. pp. 546-559. On November 27, 2018, the Defendants responded to
Ms. Walsh's motion for reconsideration. R. pp. 577-598. On February 5, 2019, the Court denied
7

Ms. Walsh's motion for reconsideration and granted the Defendants' motion for costs and entered
judgment in favor of the Defendants. R. pp. 608-624. On March 19, 2019, Ms. Walsh filed the
Notice of Appeal in this matter. R. pp. 625-638.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Issue 1:
Whether the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants where Ms. Walsh filed her complaint for legal malpractice within two years
from the first date of any objective proof that would support the existence of some actual
damage occurred.
Summary judgment may be entered only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P.
56(a). The Court must "liberally construes the facts and existing record in favor of the nonmoving party" in making such determination. Hall v. Forslojf, 124 Idaho 771, 773, 864 P.2d 609,
611 (1993). "If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the
evidence, the motion must be denied." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108
P.3d 380, 385 (2005).
Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) provides that a legal malpractice claim must be commenced within
two years after the cause of action has accrued. LC. §§ 5-201 & 5-219(4); see also City ofMcCall

v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009). However, this Court has required that
"a cause of action for professional negligence cannot accrue until some damage has occurred.

Buxton, 146 Idaho at 659. "Potential harm or an increase in the risk of damage is not sufficient to
constitute some damage." Id. Moreover, "an action for professional malpractice shall be deemed
to have accrued for the purposes of LC. § 5-219(4) only when there is objective proof that would
8

support the existence of some actual damage." Id. at 660, quoting Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho
482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992). This court has further clarified the decision in Buxton
when it adopted the completed tort theory. Molen v. Christian, 161 Idaho 577, 580, 388 P.3d 591,
594 (2017)
Issue 2:
Whether the district court erred by not allowing the question of when damages were
ascertainable to be presented to the jury.

The manner and extent to which an individual is injured is a question for the fact finder to
determine. Bentzinger v. McMurtrey, 100 Idaho 273, 274, 596 P.2d 785, 786 (Idaho, 1979)(citing

Gonzales v. Hodsdon, 91 Idaho 330, 420 P.2d 813 (1966)). The jury is in the best position to
determine the when the injury occurred, the manner of injury, and the extent of injury. There is a
material dispute between the parties as to when Ms. Walsh sustained ascertainable damages.
In legal negligence actions the question regarding when a cause of action accrues, when is
there some damage, is a mixed question of law and fact depending on whether any issues of
material fact exist. Molen, 161 Idaho at 580, 388 P.3d 591, 594 (2017), quoting Nerco Minerals

Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d 894, 898 (2004).

Issue 3:
Whether the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants even though Ms. Walsh alleged that the defendants fraudulently concealed its
negligence from the Plaintiff and Ms. Walsh filed her cause of action against the Defendants
within one year of learning of the concealed information.
Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) provides that where an alleged wrongdoer has "fraudulently and
knowingly concealed" the wrongful act from the injured party "for the purpose of escaping
9

responsibility therefor," a malpractice action may be brought one year from when "the injured
party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the
condition or matter complained of." Moreover, "where discovery of a cause of action commences
the statute of limitations the date of discovery is a fact question for the jury unless there is no
evidence creating a question of fact." Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. v. Walker, 127 Idaho 12, 16, 896
P.2d 338, 342 (1995), quoting MaCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho765, 773, 820 P.2d 360, 368.

Issue 4:
Whether the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants where Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied
to Ms. Walsh's claims because Ms. Walsh was not provided fair notice as to when a cause of
action for malpractice accrues
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process oflaw .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1. The constitution of the state of
Idaho states: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." ID. CONST. art. 1, § 13. "Statutes that are found to be vague, indefinite or uncertain are in
violation of these constitutional provisions and as such are unconstitutional. Olsen v. J.A.

Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 715, 791 P.2d 1285, (1990), (citing Florida Businessmen for Free
Enter. v. State, 499 F. Supp. 346 (Fla.1980).
III.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review
"This Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de novo, and this
Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion
10

for summary judgment." Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301,385 P.3d 856 (2016). If no disputed
issues of material fact exist, then only a question of law remains. Infanger v. City ofSalmon, 13 7
Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2003). This Court exercises free review over questions oflaw.

Id. "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review." Id.
In reviewing a statute for being void for vagueness the "party asserting the
unconstitutionality of a statute bears the burden of showing its invalidity and must overcome a
strong presumption of validity. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285,
1288 (1990), quoting Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d 111 (1983). "[T]he
appropriate test to review a statute which impacts social or economic areas is the rational basis
test which requires only that the statute advances legitimate legislative goals in a rational
fashion." Id. at 711.

B. The District Court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants where Ms. Walsh filed her complaint for legal malpractice within two
years from the first date of any objective proof that would support the existence of
some actual damage.
Summary judgment may be entered only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P.
56(a). The Court must "liberally construes the facts and existing record in favor of the nonmoving party" in making such determination. Hall v. Fors/off, 124 Idaho 771, 773, 864 P.2d 609,
611 (1993). "If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the
evidence, the motion must be denied." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108
P.3d 380, 385 (2005). Ifthere is a genuine issue of material fact the motion for summary
11

judgement must be denied and the matter should proceed to trial. See Sanders v. Kuna Joint

School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 876 P.2d 154 (1994).
There is a clear dispute on the material fact of when Ms. Walsh was damaged by the
actions of the Defendants. In analyzing the "some damage" requirement for when Ms. Walsh's
action against the Defendants accrued, the District Court improperly focused on the fact that Ms.
Walsh signed a release on February 5, 2015 instead of focusing on when Ms. Walsh's damages
were objectively ascertainable. Instead of focusing on the period of time when Ms. Walsh's
damages were actually ascertainable, the court compared Ms. Walsh's claim to claim against the
attorneys in Buxton who had negligently advised the City of McCall to release its claims. Ms.
Walsh's claim is clearly distinguishable from the facts in Buxton. In Buxton, there was no
secondary claim and there was no issue as to proximate cause, which is the central question which
exists in Ms. Walsh's cases. The District Court failed to appreciate the interplay of the two
collisions, and at what point Ms. Walsh could assert a viable claim against CSA with
ascertainable damages.
Specifically, even after she signed the settlement agreement for the first collision it was
entirely plausible that either Mr. LaMott would accept full responsibility for all the damages Ms.
Walsh sustained or that a jury could award a judgment in favor of Ms. Walsh for the full measure
and extent of her injuries or damages. In either event, Ms. Walsh would have been fully
compensated for the losses she sustained from both collisions through the Walsh v. LaMott action.
If Ms. Walsh was fully compensated for her damages under the Walsh v. LaMott matter, she could
not maintain an action against the Defendants in this action for negligence. As there is no possible
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way Ms. Walsh could maintain a lawsuit against the CSA for malpractice at the time she released
her claims related to the February 8, 2013 collision, there is no viable legal basis for the accrual of
the statute oflimitations to begin on February 5, 2015. Without objectively ascertainable evidence
of damages, Ms. Walsh's claims for malpractice against the Defendants would have been
summarily dismissed.
In a claim for negligence it is not enough to assume or opine that there may be damages or
might be damages in the future; damages must be ascertainable and not speculative. Buxton, 146
Idaho at 661-662. Damages are an essential element to any negligence claim, so if Ms. Walsh was
able to obtain full compensation for her loss through the Walsh v. LaMott action, Ms. Walsh
would not have a viable claim against the Defendants.
Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) provides that a legal malpractice claim must be commenced within
two years after the cause of action has accrued. LC. §§ 5-201 & 5-219(4); see also City ofMcCall

v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009). However, this Court has required that
"a cause of action for professional negligence cannot accrue until some damage has occurred.
Buxton, 146 Idaho at 659. "Potential harm or an increase in the risk of damage is not sufficient to
constitute some damage." Id. Moreover, "an action for professional malpractice shall be deemed
to have accrued for the purposes of LC. § 5-219(4) only when there is objective proof that would
support the existence of some actual damage." Id. at 660, quoting Chicoine v. Bignall, 122 Idaho
482, 487, 835 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1992).
As noted by the District Court, the "Buxton Court explained that the basis for this
interpretation is the requirement that a plaintiff must prove damage to recover in a negligence
action. Consequently, 'some damage is required because it would be nonsensical to hold that a
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cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations before that cause of action even accrues.'
Further, there must be objective proof of the damage. The determination of what constitutes both
damage and objective proof must be decided 'on the circumstances of each case."' R. pp. 533534, (internal citations omitted), see also Buxton at 662, 201 P.3d at 635 (citation omitted).
Moreover, "[w]hen evaluating the circumstances of a case to determine whether 'some damage'
has occurred, this Court differentiates between actual damage and the potential for damage."
Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 25, 293 P.3d 645, 649 (2013).

"Conduct or action that merely creates the potential for harm, or increases the risk that the client
will incur damage, does not satisfy the 'some damage' requirement." Id. See also R. p. 533, fn 6.
This Court explained the 'some damage' requirement in Molen v. Christian, 161 Idaho
577, 388 P.3d 591 (2017). Under Molen this Court held that:
While the plain language of Idaho Code section 5-219(4) provides that the cause
of action accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of,"
this Court has applied the completed tort theory to delay the accrual of statutes of
limitations to "avoid absurd results." Davis v. Moran, 112 Idaho 703, 708, 735
P.2d 1014, 1019 (1987). In Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis and Hawley, LLP,
this Court explained the completed tort theory as it applies to professional
negligence claims:
The statute's accrual standard operates under a completed tort theory in that
the cause of action accrues when the tort is completed, an event that
corresponds with the first objectively ascertainable occurrence of some
damage. See, e.g., Streib v. Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 178-80, 706 P.2d 63, 6769 (1985). What constitutes some damage turns on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 543, 808 P.2d
876, 880 (1991).
157 Idaho 863, 866-67, 341 P.3d 580, 583-84 (2015). "Likewise, what constitutes
'objective proof of the existence of some damage suffered by the client also must
be decided on the circumstances of each case." City of McCall v. Buxton, 146
Idaho 656, 662, 201 P.3d 629, 635 (2009).
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The rationale behind the completed tort theory was illustrated in Buxton, where
this Court held that "the existence or effect of any alleged negligence on the part of
the City's Attorneys ... depended upon the outcome of the litigation" because until
the outcome was determined, there would not be objective proof of actual damage.
Id. at 663, 201 P.3d at 636.
To hold otherwise in this case "would foment future litigation initiated on
sheer surmise of potential damages in order to avoid the likely consequence
of seeing actions barred by limitations." Mack Financial Corp. v. Smith, 111
Idaho 8, 12, 720 P.2d 191, 195 (1986). Clients involved in lengthy litigation
would have to file protective lawsuits against their attorneys when following
their advice and strategy, without yet having any objective proof of actual
damage or being able to prove a cause of action for professional malpractice.
Id. In other words, it makes little sense for a plaintiff, on one hand, to rely on their
attorney, but on the other hand, file a protective malpractice action to prevent the
claim from being later barred by the statute of limitations. Applying the completed
tort theory resolves the conflict.
Id. at 580-81, 388 P.3d at 594-95.

In this case the District Court improperly determined that some damage occurred when
Ms. Walsh executed a release agreement related to the February 8, 2013 claim. R. p. 532.
Contrary to the District Court analysis and determination, there was no objective proof of the
existence of any damage suffered by Ms. Walsh at the time she signed the release. The District
Court erred because it failed to acknowledge the fundamental problem of cause, proximate cause,
and damages which are all required elements of a claim in negligence.
Specifically, as there were two collisions with overlapping injuries, even after settling the
claim for the February 8, 2013 collision, Ms. Walsh could well have recovered for the full extent
of her injuries though the LaMott litigation. While Ms. Walsh acknowledges that it was ill
advised to settle the February 8, 2013 claim prior to reaching a global settlement, ill-advised does
not mean determinative of legal malpractice which requires evidence of damages.
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Ms. Walsh argued in her opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
first date there was objectively ascertainable evidence that Ms. Walsh was damaged by the
Defendants' negligence is at the time Ms. Walsh settled her claims against Mr. LaMott on
September 21, 2017. R. pp. 321-322. Had Ms. Walsh been able to obtain a full settlement or
judgment for the total overlapping injury claim in the second action, there would have been no
damage caused by the Defendants' negligence and the Plaintiff would not have had a claim
against the Defendants. Thus, the claim for damages was speculative until the May 7, 2013
collision was resolved. The claim against the Defendants was not ripe until the tort was completed
and damages were ascertained. But under the District Court's ruling, any plaintiff in Ms. Walsh's
position would have to file a protective lawsuit to avoid having her claims barred by the statute of
limitations - even though there may be no damages. Such actions would be wholly contrary to
this Court's holding under Molen and its progenitor cases. See Molen v. Christian, 161 Idaho 577,
582, 388 P.3d 591, 595 (2017).
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that this Court determines that settlement of the
May 7, 2013 collision claim was not required to show objectively ascertainable evidence of some
damages, there was no objectively ascertainable evidence that Ms. Walsh suffered some damage
by signing the release for the first collision claim on February 5, 2015. At the time Ms. Walsh
signed the February 5, 2015 release, no complaint had been filed against Mr. LaMott and there
was no evidence available to Ms. Walsh that Mr. LaMott was even going to dispute the claim. It
is undisputed that the May 7, 2013 collision caused more damage and injury to Ms. Walsh than
the February 8, 2013 collision. But as indicated above, there has never been a determination as to
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the allocation of damages. While it may be true that Mr. LaMott could have relied on the empty
chair argument to defend himself against Ms. Walsh's claims after Ms. Walsh signed a release for
the first collision, whether he would or would not use this defense, or whether Mr. LaMott would
even contest Ms. Walsh's claims against him were entirely speculative at the time Ms. Walsh
signed the February 5, 2015 release. The complaint against Mr. LaMott was not even filed until
April 29, 2015. Mr. LaMott did not file an answer to the complaint until September 23, 2015. 1 R.
p. 528.
At least up until the time Mr. LaMott disputed Ms. Walsh's claim, there was no
objectively ascertainable evidence that Ms. Walsh suffered any damage as a result of the
Defendants' negligence. At the earliest, the only evidence that Mr. LaMott was going to dispute
Ms. Walsh's claims against him was when he filed his answer denying Ms. Walsh's allegations of
Mr. LaMott's liability on September 23, 2015. Ms. Walsh filed the complaint in this matter on
March 2, 2017, well within the two year requirement under Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) from the date
Mr. LaMott filed his answer. R. p. 7.

C. The District Court erred by not allowing the question of when damages were
ascertainable to be presented to the jury.
Where there is a genuine issue of material fact the motion for summary judgement must be
denied and the matter should proceed to trial. See Sanders v. Kuna Joint Schoof Dist., 125 Idaho
872, 876 P.2d 154 (1994). There are four elements which must be proved to establish a claim for
negligence 1. Duty, 2. Breach, 3. Causation, 4. Damages. Estate ofBecker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho

1

Mr. LaMott's answer to the complaint was not presented to the District Court, however this
Court can take judicial notice thereof pursuant to Rule 201 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
17

522, 96 P.3d 623, (2004), (citing McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321
(2003).
Uniquely, the question of when the claim for a professional negligence accrues for the
purposes of determining the statute of limitations is factually dependent on elements 3 and 4 of
the claim for negligence itself. Unique to professional negligence actions a question of causation,
proximate cause, and damages are very fact specific and are not as easy to determine as say the
date of a collision. The question of when the cause of action accrues is intertwined with the
question for damages and as such the question, whether presented as a special question or not,
should be presented to a jury for determination. It has been acknowledged in nearly every
reported case in Idaho that lawyers stand in a unique position of being able to correct their own
errors and mitigate damages that their clients may suffer from their poor conduct. Specifically, the
courts have found that while an attorney may make a mistake, they may also rectify that mistake
prior to the client sustaining any damage. Without damages there cannot be a claim for
professional negligence.
Ms. Walsh has alleged that her damages were not ascertainable until proximate cause
could be established, i.e., when the Walsh v. LaMott claim was settled. However, at minimum the
questions as to when there was objectively ascertainable evidence of some damage is a question
of fact, which is clearly in dispute, and therefore should to be presented to a jury. In hindsight,
Ms. Walsh may well have suffered damages on the date she signed the release on February 5,
2015. However, that is not the question that was before the District Court and it is not the
question that is before this Court. The question is on what date was there objectively ascertainable
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evidence of some damage. Given the issues of overlapping injury and proximate cause, this is a
question for the jury, not for the District Court or this Court to summarily extinguish based on
pure speculation. Accordingly, this Court should overrule the District Court's orders and remand
this matter back to the District Court for further proceedings.
It is the responsibility of the jury to determine damages. Bentzinger v. McMurtrey, 100

Idaho 273, 274, 596 P.2d 785, 786 (Idaho, 1979)(citing Gonzales v. Hodsdon, 91 Idaho 330, 420
P.2d 813 (1966)). In legal negligence actions the question regarding when a cause of action
accrues, when is there some damage, is a mixed question of law and fact depending on whether
any issues of material fact exist. Molen v. Christian, 161 Idaho 577, 580, 388 P.3d 591, 594
(2017), quoting Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90 P.3d
894, 898 (2004 ). The district court erred in determining the question itself and not allowing a jury
to make the decision based on the facts presented.

D. The District Court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants where there is a question of fact as to whether the Defendants
fraudulently concealed the fact that they were informed of a claim of subrogation
which Ms. Walsh is contractually obligated to repay in order to convince Ms. Walsh
to settle the February 8. 2013 claim.
Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) provides that where an alleged wrongdoer has "fraudulently and
knowingly concealed" the wrongful act from the injured party "for the purpose of escaping
responsibility therefor," a malpractice action may be brought one year from when "the injured
party knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been put on inquiry regarding the
condition or matter complained of." Moreover, "where discovery of a cause of action commences
the statute of limitations the date of discovery is a fact question for the jury unless there is no
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evidence creating a question of fact." Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. v. Walker, 127 Idaho 12, 16, 896
P.2d 338, 342 (1995), quoting MaCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho765, 773, 820 P.2d 360, 368.
In this case, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants knew that they had committed
malpractice and concealed the fact from Ms. Walsh and her attorney. Ms. Walsh requested her file
for both collisions when she started to be represented by Mr. Beckett following his termination
with CSA. In producing her file CSA did not include the letter from CW regarding the claim for
subrogation. That letter was not produced until discovery was requested in the present action.
Ms. Walsh alleged that CSA fraudulently concealed the CW subrogation letter to mitigate its
potential exposure. The fact that the Defendant concealed the letter begs the question as to
whether CSA fraudulently concealed the letter to avoid a claim for malpractice.
Ms. Walsh clearly filed this action within one year from the time that the withheld
information was disclosed to the Plaintiff, the action is timely and should not be barred by this
Court.
1. Defendants fraudulently concealed their malpractice from Ms. Walsh.

Some time prior to or shortly after negotiating a settlement agreement for the February 8,
2013 collision, the Defendants received a letter from Blue Cross of Idaho asserting subrogation
rights apportioning more than $60,000 of medical treatment and care for the first collision - more
than 3 ½ times the amount of the settlement that CSA negotiated on behalf of the Plaintiff. R. pp.
343-344. Ms. Walsh provided a sworn statement that she did not become aware of Blue Cross of
Idaho's claim until Mr. Beckett counsel received the letter through discovery. R. pp. 332-334.
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By concealing the Blue Cross Blue Shield subrogation letter, the Defendants intentionally
concealed the only concrete information available to Ms. Walsh that the Defendants had
committed malpractice.
Accordingly, the statute of limitation should be tolled until the Plaintiff became aware that
the Defendants had committed malpractice. Once tolled, the Plaintiffs claims are timely and this
Court should deny the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
In spite of these clear and supported allegations of fraudulent concealment, the District
Court found that Ms. Walsh provided no evidence that she did not know of the potential
malpractice during that time, nor did she provide any evidence showing that in the exercise of
reasonable care she should not have been put on inquiry regarding the malpractice. As an initial
matter, the Court improperly shifted the burden of proof in relation to a motion for Summary
Judgment. Ms. Walsh acknowledges that "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to
the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment." Stafford v.

Weaver, 136 Idaho 223,225, 31 P.3d 245,247 (2001) (citations omitted). However, Ms. Walsh
did not rest upon the allegations in the pleadings, rather as required by Idaho law, she expressly
"set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." See Gagnon v. W

Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 114, 306 P.3d 197, 199 (2013).
Moreover, the Court's assertion that Ms. Walsh did not provide evidence that she did not
know of the potential malpractice is wholly false. Specifically, Ms. Walsh provided a sworn
affidavit wherein in relevant part she attested as follows:
48. The first time that I met with Mr. Kristian Beckett in the Craig Swapp &
Associates office in Idaho, Mr. Beckett asked me why I settled the February 7,
2013 case. I told Mr. Beckett that the reason why I settled that case is because
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Stephen Redd told me that I should. I said that Mr. Redd said that this was the best
offer I was going to get on the February 7, 2013 case and that I should probably
accept it. That I could file the case but that I wouldn't likely do much better. I said
that if he thinks that I wouldn't do much better than it would be okay to settle. Mr.
Beckett informed me that it was not a good idea to settle one of two claims where
the other claim is still pending in litigation where there is an overlapping injury.
Mr. Beckett said that there would be an "empty chair" and that it would be difficult
to deal with.
49. I am the type of person who trusts the professionals in my life. I trust Rusty
Dodge with my health, I trust Jon Gray with my health, I trust all my doctors with
my health. I trusted my attorneys with my case.
50. I rely on the professionals in my life to give me the information necessary to
make the right decision for me and my life. I rely on the professionals and trust
that what they are telling me is true and accurate and is provided with my best
interest in mind and at heart. When Mr. Redd advised me to settle and told me that
spending more money on my case would not increase the amount of money that I
would get on the claim from the February 8, 2013 crash I accepted his assertions as
true. I had no way of knowing that the information he was getting paid to provide
was wrong or faulty.
R. pp. 334-335.
Ms. Walsh Further attested that:
57. I later had my deposition taken by Mr. Stefanie at his office. During my
deposition it was clear that Mr. Stefanie wanted to put the blame for my injuries on
something other than the May 7, 2013 car crash.
58. Following my deposition Mr. Beckett informed me that it was his opinion that
the firm, and more specifically, Mr. Stephen Redd, committed malpractice when
he recommended that I settle the February 8, 2013 case.
59. Prior to Mr. Beckett informing me that the firm committed malpractice in the
course of representing me for my February 8, 2013 injury claim. Prior to the events
discussed herein I have no real experience with the legal or civil justice system
which would have given me any idea that something was wrong. Again I trusted
that my attorneys would do the right thing for my case. Mr. Redd told me not to
worry about anything that the firm would take care of everything.
R. p. 336.
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Critically, the deposition of Ms. Walsh by Mr. Stefanie was taken on March 25, 2016. R.
p. 318. In addition, as presented throughout the pleadings and arguments, Ms. Walsh expressly
stated that the first time she was informed that the Defendants likely committed malpractice was
after the March 25, 2016 deposition. Ms. Walsh filed her complaint for malpractice on March 2,
2017, clearly within the one-year statute of limitations as provided for under Idaho Code§ 5219(4).

2. There is no rational or legal basis to impute the knowledge of any agent of CSA,
including Mr. Beckett while he was employed by CSA to Ms. Walsh.
In granting the Defendants motion for summary judgment, the District Court expressly
stated that it was imputing Mr. Beckett's knowledge to Ms. Walsh. See R. pp. 538-541. Ms.
Walsh acknowledges that "[u]nder our system of representative litigation, 'each party is deemed
bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have 'notice of all facts, notice of
which can be charged upon the attorney."' Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 91
(1990) (citation omitted). However, imputing the knowledge of a lawyer working for a law firm
that is accused of fraudulent concealment, stretches this legal construct beyond all reason and
rational. If a law firm can defend itself by asserting that the knowledge of a lawyer working for
the firm can be imputed to a client, there would never be a case where a plaintiff could maintain a
claim for fraudulent concealment. It would be a practical impossibility to show that a lawyer
concealed something that could be imputed to the client.
Certainly, Mr. Beckett had ethical responsibilities to the client. But Mr. Swapp and Mr.
Redd and every other attorney working for CSA shared the same ethical duties. Complicating
these duties is the relationship each of these attorneys had with CSA. Moreover, a mere belief that
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the firm had been negligent does not make it a fact. Nor, is it sufficient to summarily defeat a
claim for malpractice. Critically, the only evidence the Defendants presented were internal emails
and notes in the client file which are not accessible to the client. See R. pp. 468-473. There was
no evidence presented that Ms. Walsh was provided this information prior to the Defendants'
motion for summary judgment and no basis for imputing the knowledge of an agent of the
tortfeasor to the victim. The only evidence presented showed that Ms. Walsh knew or was
reasonably put on notice of the Defendants' malpractice was following Ms. Walsh's deposition on
March 25, 2016 which was less than one year prior to Ms. Walsh filing the malpractice action
against the Defendants.

3. The question of when Ms. Walsh knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should
have been put on inquiry regarding the Defendants' malpractice are issues of fact
that should be left to the iury.
This Court has held that "where discovery of a cause of action commences the statute of
limitations the date of discovery is a fact question for the jury unless there is no evidence creating
a question of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 773, 820 P.2d 360, 368 (1991); see also Reis
v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434,438, 660 P.2d 46, 50 (1982). At minimum, Ms. Walsh's sworn statement
that she did not know and had no reason to believe that CSA or Redd had committed malpractice
until at the earliest March 25, 2016 presents a fact question in this case. Furthermore, even
assuming that Mr. Beckett's knowledge could be imputed to Ms. Walsh, it is entirely in dispute
what Mr. Beckett knew and when. Thus, here again this creates a question of fact for jury and
should not have been summarily determined by the District Court. The fact that Ms. Walsh
learned that it was ill-advised to settle one of her claims without settling the other did not create a
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reasonable basis for her to be put on notice that the Defendants had committed malpractice. This
is the primary point made in Molen and Buxton and their progeny that without ascertainable
damages there can be no cause of action for legal negligence.
As argued previously, there was no evidence at the time Mr. Beckett first met with Ms.
Walsh, that Ms. Walsh had suffered any actual damages. Deviation from the standard of care, or
best practices does not equate to malpractice. The question is on what date did Ms. Walsh know
or should have been put on inquiry. Given the fact that the only evidence is based on internal
memos, emails, and notes that were under the control of the alleged tortfeasor, this is a question
for the jury, not for the District Court or this Court to summarily extinguish based on pure
speculation. Accordingly, this Court should overrule the District Court's orders and remand this
matter back to the District Court for further proceedings.

4. The District Court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants where Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness as
applied to Ms. Walsh's claims because Ms. Walsh was not provided fair notice as to
when a cause of action for malpractice accrues.
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process oflaw .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1. The constitution of the state of
Idaho states: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." ID. CONST. art. 1, § 13. "Statutes that are found to be vague, indefinite or uncertain are in
violation of these constitutional provisions and as such are unconstitutional. Olsen v. J.A.

Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 715, 791 P.2d 1285, (1990), (citing Florida Businessmen for Free
Enter. v. State, 499 F. Supp. 346 (Fla.1980).
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The void for vagueness doctrine incorporates the due process notions of fair notice or
warning, and mandates that lawmakers set reasonably clear guidelines for triers of fact in order to
prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' Id. "In evaluating a constitutional challenge
to a statute on the basis of void for vagueness, the Court must consider both the essential fairness
of the law and the impracticability of drafting legislation with greater specificity." Id. "It is
established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague
and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges
and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in
each particular case .... " Id.
The courts have interpreted and reinterpreted Idaho Code 5-219(4), as to when a cause of
action for legal malpractice accrues. As articulated by the American Bar Association, Professional
Liability Litigation Committee:
The definition of what constitutes "some damage" is anything but clear and,
consequently, Idaho appellate courts have reached seemingly incongruous holdings
in many of these cases. In some instances, the "some damage" requirement has
been applied loosely, resulting in holdings that a cause of action did not accrue
until well after the alleged misconduct occurred. In other cases, courts have
provided a tighter application of the "some damage" requirement in different ways
with several reported decisions as to the issue of when a cause of action accrues. 2
Just the sheer number of cases this Court has had to resolve over this issue should be a key
notice to the Court that the statute, as it relates to when the cause of action accrues is confusing,
vague, and unintelligible. More importantly, if this Court finds that the statute of limitation began

Baldwin, Merri A.; Bertschi, Scott F.; Black, Dylan C.; American Bar Association, Professional
Liability Committee. (2012) Law of Lawyers' Liability: Fifty-State Survey of Legal Malpractice,
p. 131, (citations omitted).
2
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to accrue when Ms. Walsh signed the release on February 5, 2015, the statute as applied to Ms.
Walsh's claim failed to provide Ms. Walsh fair notice as to whether Ms. Walsh had to have
determinable damages prior to filing her action for malpractice and when her cause of action
accrued under the law. Given the level of confusions for well experienced lawyers, there is no
reasonable basis for an average citizen, like Ms. Walsh, to divine when her claim accrued.
Regardless, even under a rational basis scrutiny, Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) fails to meet the
requirements of the Due Process Clause because it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the
public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without
any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case."

Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 715, 791 P.2d 1285, (1990). Accordingly, the Court
should be invalidate the statute as applied to Ms. Walsh and remand this matter back to the
District Court for further proceedings.

IV.

CONCLUSION

This appeal involves four legal questions: 1) When does the two-year statute of limitations
under Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) begin to accrue where there is an overlapping injury claim; 2)
whether a jury should decide the issue of when damages are ascertainable in a legal malpractice
action; 3) Whether the knowledge of an attorney who is an employee and agent of a tortfeasor can
be imputed to a client to overcome the fraudulent concealment provisions of Idaho Code § 5219(4); and 4) Whether Idaho Code§ 5-219(4) is constitutionally void for vagueness as applied to
Ms. Walsh's claims. The district court erred in its determination of issues 1-3 by failing to
consider the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
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The statute of limitation does not begin to accrue until there is objectively ascertainable
evidence of some damage. In this case, there was no such evidence until, at the earliest,
September 23, 2015 when Mr. LaMott filed an answer to Ms. Walsh's complaint denying
liability. However, disclaiming liability is not dispositive and would not in itself trigger a claim
for damage, but at least this is a clear date when it was objectively ascertainable that Ms. Walsh
was not going to be fully made whole for her damages. It is also reasonable that the statute of
limitations would begin to accrue on March 25, 2016, because the Defendants intentionally and
fraudulently concealed their negligence. Furthermore, the failure to disclose the Blue Cross of
Idaho demand letters from Ms. Walsh is a date when the Statute of Limitations could have started
to accrue. At minimum, the question of when damages accrued is a question for the jury to
decide. The question of whether CSA fraudulently concealed evidence and when Ms. Walsh was
reasonably put on notice of the malpractice is another issue for the jury to decide. Lastly, this
Court should hold that Idaho Code §5-219(4) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ms.
Walsh's claim. Wherefore based on the foregoing, Ms. Walsh respectfully requests that this Court
overrule the District Court's orders in this case and remand this matter back to the District Court
for further proceedings.
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